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Political geographies of oil investigate extractive value chains with an emphasis
on governance and scales, analysing the role that territories and especially
spatial networks play in these dynamics. While underlining the limits and
gaps of territorial governance, as it is nowadays theorized and used in the
academic literature, extractive resources, particularly in developing contexts,
call for fluid networks, and multiscalar governance; more flexible and adapted
to changing contexts. This approach leads to networked justice, as a consequent
adaptation of spatial justice to these specific situations. This article points
out, for instance, the geopolitics of pipelines in Africa and its critical role in
transforming the continent, despite its related challenges and conflicts. It
advocates a better governance of extractive resources in Africa. Scholars
have a role to play in this process, helping to analyse critical phenomena and
sensitive dynamics, as well as provide sound policy recommendations.




In 1976, the French geographer Armand Frémont published La region,
espace vécu (the region, a lived space). This well-known book became
the symbol of a renewal and change of French regional geography,
calling for more flexible regions not uniquely defined by administrative
borders. Among the various examples presented in the book, Frémont
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recalls that Jean Gallais, a former French geographer, had been a
precursor studying the functional region of the internal delta of the
Niger River in Mali, showing how this space was a region created by
the economic activities of local populations. Using an unprecedented
geographical approach, compared to the regional spaces analysed by
contemporary French geographers, Gallais illustrates how human
geography may give interesting insights on the exploitation of natural
resources, studying the role of spaces, networks, and places in these
dynamics.2
From the 1940s to 1950s, the internal delta of the Niger River was
a mobile region, with changing size and shape (even from one season
to the following one), depending on the activities (fishing, cattle
raising, and agriculture) exploiting local resources (the water of the
river and the fertile land left by the river after its level had gone down
after the rainy season) at a given time. These traditional socio-economic
activities and livelihood strategies of the region became more complex
over time, as new resources were discovered and exploited (such as
hydraulic energy). Furthermore, the use of coveted and limited
resources (like land), the need to adapt to constraints (due to climate
change and hydraulic infrastructures, like the dam built in Mopti), and
environmental protection policies produce difficulties, conflicts, and
tensions.3 The logics regulating the way societies function in their space,
exploiting the resources locally available have changed in the region
as new activities (like the unsuccessful irrigated rice production in the
past4 and tourism in recent times) have been added. Activities, like
cattle-raising and agriculture, produce overlapping and intertwining
spaces, while the commercialization of fish creates multiscalar networks,
where key places like the river or urban centres are crucial centres.
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Gallais’ (1967) analysis of this natural resource rich Malian region5
shows that in African contexts the exploitation of natural resources
has always created fluid, networked, and mobile regions, spaces without
borders, with changing size and shape. Inspired by Gallais’ precursor
vision, in the contemporary global world, resource extraction and
transformation produce mobile spaces,6 open by nature, where
movement (of products, individuals, and powers) is at the core.
Consequently, places are intersections, where different realities and
interests come together. Territories, intended as spaces with fixed
borders, are consequently bypassed by these multiscalar spatial logics
of mobility and fluidity.
How geographers define regions and translate them into reality by
planning and policy is often similar to fixed territories, explaining its
intrinsic limitations regarding natural resource exploitation in a global
world. The history of French geography and how regions were studied
in the past also give insights into regional integration, as encouraged
by African states and international institutions and organizations in
contemporary Africa. Regions studied by the so-called possibilist
geography of Paul Vidal de la Blache and his followers7 was a territorial
division determined once and for all with precise and well-defined
borders, often linked to an administrative division, dictated by historical
and social reasons and/or justifications related to physical factors (a
river, a mountain, etc.), impressing a strong territorial fracture. The
African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are nowadays macro-
territories, made up of the national territories of their member states.
The limitations of these territories come from their rigidity (their fixed
borders) and their level8 (too large areas), making territorial governance
more challenging.9 Scale, in geography, refers to the changing size of a
5 Jean Gallais, Le delta intérieur du Niger. Etudes de géographie régionale (Institut
Français d’Afrique Noire 1967).
6 Denis Retaillé, “De l’espace nomade à l’espace mobile en passant par l’espace du
contrat” (2012) Harchives ouvertes <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00679163/document> accessed 24 January 2016.
7 Vincent Berdoulay, La formation de l’Ecole française de géographie (Editions du
C.T.H.S. 1995); Paul Claval, Histoire de la géographie (PUF, 2011).
8 For a definition of the concept of scale in human geography and for an overview
on the debate related to it: J. Lévy and M. Lussault, Dictionnaire de la géographie
et de l’espace des societies (Belin, 2013).
9 To this has to be added a further constraint coming from the fact that African
states are resistant to give up to the RECs the power to control their territories
and their transformation over time.
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phenomenon or space and the transformation of its features.
This rigid possibilist definition of the region remained dominant
and fundamentally unchanged in French geography until the end of
the 1950s. Only in the 1960s-1970s, with the advent of what has been
named the new geography, and its concept of space, did the region
become a less homogeneous area in which the geographer could identify
coherent spatial units linked by interrelated processes. This theoretical
development allowed geographers to point out and theorize the
fundamental role of urban centres in the structuring of regional spaces.10
This opened the way to future resource regionalisms, particularly
relevant in African contexts, where regions are mobile spaces, changing
and fluctuating with the resources available and exploited:11 they are
economic and ecological regions created by a specific resource.
They are also networked realities, such as regional electricity grids
or transboundary rivers (as exemplified by the description of the Malian
Niger River Delta previously mentioned). “Resource regionalisms may
be one of the keys to improved economic development, through
increased foreign direct investment, improved governance, and more
reliable access to energy”.12
In agreement with Deese on the need to encompass rigid and
large regional integration processes towards sector-specific regionalisms
among which the ones related to natural resources are particularly key
in Africa, this article emphasizes the need for multiscalar, fluid, and
networked governance mechanisms to better manage natural resource
exploitation, especially for networked resources, such as the
extractives.13 This mechanism and vision calls for harmonized policies
at the various levels (local, micro-regional, nation, macro-regional,
continental, and global), thus creating a multiscalar governance system.
As spaces or regions are fluid and mobile, depending on the resources
present and exploited over time, governance must also be fluid, adapting
policies and actions to the resources extracted.
10 Etienne Juillard, “La région: essai de definition” (1962) Annales de Géographie
71(387), 483-499.
11 David E. Deese (ed), Handbook of the International Political Economy of Trade
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014).
12 Ibid, p. 289.
13 Cristina D’Alessandro, “From Regional Integration to Regionalism in Africa:
Building Capacities for the Post-MDGs Agenda”, in George Kararach, Hany
Besada and Timothy Shaw (eds.), Development in Africa. Refocusing the Lens
after the Millennium Development Goals (Policy Press, 2015), 261-292.
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These views on multiscalar, networked, and fluid governance are
particularly helpful in developing contexts, such as in African countries,
where gaps in institutional capacities, political instability, risks,
conflictual situations, and social inequalities make the governance of
natural resources particularly difficult, but at the same time strategic,
because success and failures in this domain have key consequences at
various levels (from local conflicts to the global consequences of the
market pressures on oil).
The impact of a more or less efficient management of natural
resources may not be limited to the political and economic spheres.
Natural resource governance produces sizeable effects on the quality
of life of individuals and local societies in both negative and positive
ways, whether through accumulated revenues (better incomes, changing
lifestyles, new patterns of consumption, etc.) or environmental impacts
(pollution, risks, health concerns, etc.). Exploitation of natural resources
demands effective governance to protect and accompany societies in
their transformation due to resource extraction. The discovery of a
new natural resource in a given place or the exploitation made possible
by new technologies available at certain time change the life of the
local communities living nearby, even if only through the impact on
higher prices paid by consumers to buy food or ordinary products or
by the pollution that their exploitation may engender.
Inspired by some geographical concepts, theories and approaches,
as well by African examples, this article explores alternative fluid,
networked, and multiscalar governance regimes14 in African contexts.
Governance structures and capacities in fact greatly vary with the scale
of action (from the local community level to the continental and even
global scale) and the resource (oil governance is much different from
land governance, as their geographical patterns are diversified). After
a presentation of various geographies of oil at different scales, the
article develops an analysis of its fluid, multiscalar, and networked
governance. This governance is a multifaceted and complex mechanism
of interaction and management in which numerous stakeholders are
14 A governance regime defines the quality and level of functioning of political
institutions. Nevertheless it has been demonstrated that it is related to the
economy, especially to the capacity to control corruption and sustain growth
through effective natural resource extraction (Toke Aidt, Jayasri Dutta and
Vania Sena, “Governance regimes, corruption, and growth: theory and evidence”
(2008), Journal of Comparative Economics, 36, 195-220).
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involved and with a fundamental environmental dimension. It cannot
be reduced to state agreements and to the role of oil companies in oil
extraction: it encompasses the national level, creating mobile and
networked spaces. This oil governance also calls for a networked fluid,
networked, and multiscalar spatial justice, taking into account the role
and specific characteristics of these spaces to set in place management
mechanisms protecting the environment as well as the interests of the
various stakeholders involved, especially the most vulnerable among them.
After this introduction, this article defines and questions in section
2 the political geography of oil. Section 3 presents territorial governance,
underlining its unsatisfactory features for extractive resources. Section
4 consequently investigates some characteristics of the fluid, networked,
and multiscalar governance of oil. Section 5 introduces the concept of
spatial justice into this approach, calling instead for networked justice.
The article ends by presenting the advantages offered by a better
governance framework of extractives in Africa. Governance of extractives
indeed has a crucial role across the continent, given their widespread
and unique geographical features.
2.  POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF OIL
 AND THEIR SCALES
Among contemporary natural resources, oil has certainly a peculiar
place for its key overriding socio-economic role, but also for the
complexity of the consequences that it produces at various levels.15
Michael Watts has underlined that the liquid and greasy status of oil is
not insignificant to understand its related dynamics.16 Oil is a hidden,
inflammable, and explosive liquid: it is by nature not very propitious
to be domesticated and transformed. For instance, some reserves in
deep water exploited in Morocco, Egypt and Angola are located 10,660m
below sea level, requiring very sophisticated technologies17 to
15 Jean Pierre Favennec and Philippe Copinschi, “Les nouveaux enjeux pétroliers
en Afrique” (2003) Politique africaine, 1(89), 127-148.
16 Michael Watts, “Petro-violence: Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology of
a Mythic Commodity” in Nancy L. Peluso and Michael Watts (eds.), Violent
environments (Cornell University Press 2001), 189-212.
17 Ernest & Young. “Deepwater oil and gas. BP’s expertise and technology are
helping to extract deepwater oil and gas safely and efficiently” (2014). British
Petroleum <http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/the-
energy-future/deepwater-oil-and-gas.html> accessed 4 September 2015.
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a Mythic Commodity” in Nancy L. Peluso and Michael Watts (eds), Violent
environments (Cornell University Press 2001), 189-212; Michael Watts, “Oil,
Development, and the Politics of the Bottom Billion” (2009) Macalester
International, 24(11) <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1233&context=macintl> accessed 4 September 2015.
19 Michael Watts. “Oil, Development, and the Politics of the Bottom Billion” (2009)
Macalester International, 24(11) <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1233&context=macintl> accessed 4 September 2015.
20 Damina Advisors. “Collapsing commodity prices could trigger an African Spring”
(2015) Damina Advisors <http://www.daminaadvisors.com/admin/
documents/DaMina%20Commodity%20Price%20Collapse%20and%20
Africa.pdf> accessed 4 September 4 2015.
domesticate them. Its exploitation is then by itself difficult, dangerous,
and contaminant given the nature of the raw material.
The social consequences of oil extraction have to be added to these
practical and intrinsic issues. Michael Watts has pointed out that the
problems and crises related to oil are not predominantly related to its
eventual or prospective depletion, with its suite of possible economic
and financial consequences on the markets. The most dramatic crises
are engendered by the fights for the economic benefits of oil exploitation
among the stakeholders concerned and by the socio-ecological price of
the production and use of this raw material.18 Oil crises are then more
significantly local (meaning micro-regional), where the social and
environmental effects are heavy, than national and global, where the
changing price of oil only indirectly affects local communities, daily
submitted to environmental degradation of reduced livelihood
opportunities. Michael Watts has documented these dynamics in the
Niger Delta, in Nigeria. Hisanalyses, published in 2009, are still valuable
and relevant in the Nigerian context in 2016 and even more dramaticin
the light of the implications of oil price slide, as the economic benefits
of oil could be reduced.19
On the continental and global scales, the decline in world crude oil
price certainly produces worries. Economic and financial consequences
and political destabilization could be engendered by the decreasing
price of oil in Africa. These risks and possible negative implications are
documented and measured for African states by Damina Advisors,20
using a commodity price collapse instability risk rating. Given that 20
African countries were oil producers in 2014 and considering the key
role that oil production plays in most of these economies, after the
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21 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), The World Factbook 2013-2014 (CIA, 2014).
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(Lux Research 2013).
23 Gail Tverberg “World Oil Production at 3/31/2014. Where Are We Headed?”
(2014) oilprice.com <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/World-Oil-
Production-at-3312014Where-are-We-Headed.html> accessed 17 August
2015.
24 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), The World Factbook 2013-2014 (CIA 2014).
Arab Spring, an African Spring could set the continent on fire, starting
from countries with very high and high economic risks and with unstable
political contexts (like Libya, South Sudan, Central African Republic,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Republic of Congo) and
expanding to 40 other African countries with a medium level of risk.21
It is a continental risk.
The extractive geography of oil is also changing on a global scale.
The output of traditional producer countries decreases, while other
countries are becoming prominent in the sector. If in fact, oil production
increased in absolute terms at the global level from 1994 to 2014,
things are bound to be more complex at the national level. New and
improved oil technologies explain at least partially the growing
production in absolute terms. Oil can be extracted faster than was
possible in the past. That said, some of these recent technological
advancements, such as hydraulic fracturing, are controversial. They
use chemical products which pollute the environment to a high degree,
thus accelerating climate change.22
Beyond technological factors, political and geopolitical factors play
an important role at the regional and national level. Saudi Arabian
production of crude oil remains stable during the same period, while
Russian output has been rising steadily since 2009: it is nevertheless
light or ultra light oil, more volatile compared to crude oil, so the
quality and typology of oil available in the markets is changing.
Canadian and Chinese productions have also increased, while that of
Iran has declined since 2011.23According to estimations for 2014, Russia
is the first global producer with more than 10 million barrels per day;
the United States is ranked third. Among the first 10 global oil
producers, only three are Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
These are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, ranking
second, eighth, and ninth, respectively, at the global level.24
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In the geographies of oil, contemporary geopolitical shifts are also
confirmed by the changing role of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which accounts for four African member
countries (Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria). Growing production in
non-OPEC countries (especially the United States) and other geopolitical
factors (including the slight easing of sanctions against Iran since 2014)
make the OPEC henceforth unable to set global oil prices.25
Nigeria remained the largest African producer in 2015, but the crises
in Libya and Egypt and the uncertainties on the future of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) may change the African landscape in the
future. Libya and Egypt, despite their limited production by global
standards, could destabilize the entire Maghreb (where Algeria is a
sizeable producer) with consequences in sub-Saharan Africa as well as
in the rest of the Arab world. Political instability in the DRC would
also affect Central Africa, through its relationships with the neighbouring
countries and far beyond the entire continent. The DRC is, in fact, a
member state of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and of the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS). Plus, internal instability or breakdown in DRC would affect
its relations with neighbouring Uganda and Angola, both oil producing
countries. Nigerian issues relating to the management of oil revenues,
corruption, and insecurity could also have an impact on the continental
geography of oil and furthermore on the global oil industry.
Figure 1, an infography by Ernest & Young, shows how the
production of oil and gas in Africa is changing on the continental,
regional, and local levels: in absolute terms, revenues have doubled in
a decade, following the reforms, and consequently a better and more
transparent management. At the regional level, key producers are
emerging in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, and
Tanzania). At the micro level, the presence of various types of deposits
(deep sea, inland, and offshore) has to be emphasized, as well as the
creation of a continuous area of oil exploitation in West Africa between
Senegal and Angola, along the Gulf of Guinea. This coastline, where
oil wells and platforms are next to each other across national borders,
raises the need for a fluid and multiscalar governance, harmonizing
25 Ante Batovic, “OPEC loosing its ability to set global oil prices” (2015) Global Risk
Insights <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/06/opec-losing-its-ability-to-set-
global-oil-prices/> accessed 17 August 2015.
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and concerting oil policies and actions among producers in the Gulf of
Guinea. This multiscalar spatial justice would avoid or reduce the
advent of conflicts on various scales.
Figure 1. Oil and Gas in Africa: Sources of Sustainable Growth?
Source: Ernest and Young Report, ey.com/oilandgas
At the regional level, Figure 2 shows the networked geography of
pipelines, due to the need to transport oil and gas. These networks
physically translate in the landscape, commercial agreements and
international relations between states, as well as interests of private
actors participating to these works and the complex mechanisms to
finance and realize them. The Tanzanian gas pipeline from Twara to
Dar es Salaam is, for example, financed by a Chinese loan as well as by
grants from the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank.
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(2015) The Observer October 14 <http://www.observer.ug/business/38-
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open> accessed 17 August 2015.
Whereas the cooperation between neighbouring countries still seems
challenging, with a consequent waste of financial resources and efforts,
it has also caused local protests and conflicts, as documented by the
Environmental Justice Atlas.26  Tanzania is also involved in the possible
construction of a crude oil export pipeline from Uganda. The two
countries did sign an agreement in 2015 to study this possibility, while
the Ugandan government is also considering options through Kenya.
Toyota Tsusho, Total, Chinal National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), Tullow, and the Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation are among the stakeholders involved or trying to direct
the project along the lines of their interests.27
The geopolitics of pipelines revolves around dialogues and conflicts
between stakeholders to manage the pipelines. It includes agreements
among countries and initiatives from the private sector and civil society.
It has to deal with geological constraints, state interests, and
negotiations between stakeholders. Thus, the exchanges between
Ethiopia and South Sudan aim at building a pipeline connecting Djibouti
to South Sudan, through a wide and rugged landscape of swamps and
mountains in Ethiopia, to exclude Kenya willingly from the project.
Oil and gas pipelines are spatial networks, confirming that experiences
of multiscalar and fluid governance exist. Their challenges are related
to their international dimension and to the interactions between
stakeholders with often, incompatible interests and goals. They
nevertheless offer the advantage to transform spaces and possibly
improve the governance of oil and gas through dialogues involving
diverse stakeholders and a form of networked justice.
At the local level, the geography of oil is neither spatial nor territorial
(as it is the case for other resources, as land for example): it is a
networked geography. These spatial networks are made of hubs of oil
and gas wells, where the high concentration of oil and gas extracted in
isolated holes makes models of territorial control inappropriate. This
networked distribution of wells increase the conflict potential of places
of oil and gas extraction, where economic, financial, and political
interests are numerous. The power of control over these places does
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not come from a form of territorial administration. This explains the
incapacity of states to control oil and gas wells fully. The technical
extractive expertise of multinational companies gives them an
unbalanced power, often attempting to bypass state power. The local
level is where government pressure, corruption, local uprising, and
social conflicts express comparative advantages, attributes, and
capacities, together with the power struggles associated with these
uneven distributions.
Increasing the technical expertise of African oil companies would
reduce the competitive advantage of foreign multinationals and their
dangerous attempts to circumvent state control on oil exploitations,
even through corrupt practices. Social transactions (compromises and
agreements with different stakeholders, including local populations)
are also needed to minimize conflicts: local content policies are useful
frameworks to encourage these mechanisms of collaboration.28 The
conflicts, vulnerability, and risks related to oil exploitation also explain
price volatility, engendered by the real or imaginary fear that there
28 Silvana Tordo, Michael Warner, Osmel E. Manzano and Yahya Anouti, Local
Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector (World Bank Publications, 2013).
Figure 2. Existing and proposed oil pipelines
Source: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21578402-
east-africa-danger-throwing-away-part-its-new-found-oil
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could be a shortfall of significant sources of supply, as when Nigeria
stopped its oil production from 2006 to 2009.29
Therefore, given that the geography of oil and its specific
discontinuous modes of production are networked, as documented
above, the next section focuses on a different form of governance,
adapted to these peculiar needs, necessary to prevent, manage and
reduce the conflicts related to oil production, transport, and commerce.
Territorial governance (or geo-governance), as they are normally
theorized in geography for continuous dynamics over spaces, does not
really fit with the networked realities.
3.  TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE:
A STARTING POINT, BUT AN
INSUFFICIENT FRAMEWORK
Territorial governance is a useful concept in political and economic
geography, but also in urban and regional planning, as it breaks down
the modalities of government of territories and spaces, underlining
the interrelations between different kinds of stakeholders (public,
private, international organizations, civil society, etc.), their specific
relations with spaces, their goals, and motivations. Territorial
governance organizes transformative action on spaces and the
coordination among the stakeholders allowing it. As already
demonstrated,30 territorial governance may be practically analysed
through three dimensions by considering: the territorial or spatial layout
where the action takes place; the existing policies related to the specific
proposed action; and in the end the actions themselves (experiences,
projects, and programmes). Territorial governance decomposes the
process of change, its assumptions, its implementation, and
consequences: it is an operational tool that geographers and planners
can use to evaluate these dynamics and their results.
Territorial governance is also called geo-governance by some
29 Richard Peet, Paul Robbins and Michael Watts (eds.), Global Political Ecology
(Routledge, 2010).
30 Simin Davoudi, Neil Evans, Francesca Governa and Marco Santangelo,
“Territorial Governance in the Making. Approaches, Methodologies, Practices”
(2008), Boletin de la A.G.E.N. 46, 33-52.
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authors, underlining the shared decision-making among stakeholders.31
Geo-governance has an intrinsic ecological dimension, in line with
sustainable development theories. It is certainly also relevant for issues
related to oil and gas, as their effective governance has to take into
account the environmental concerns related to these resources.
Much of the literature on urban governance focuses on European
and other developed countries in which territorial governance is related
to urban transformation, planning, and projects, of local development.32
Local development is nowadays also studied in developing countries,
including in African contexts: in these cases, governance becomes a
tool of development, encompassing the local dimension, to turn to
multiscalar approaches.33 Territorial governance may, in fact, be used
to evaluate decentralization dynamics in which the vertical coordination
between the state and international funders intersects and is added to
the horizontal coordination among non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and a variety of local stakeholders. Fabienne Leloup, Laurence
Moyart and Bernard Pecqueur emphasize that the state is driven “from
the bottom up” (par le bas) by NGOs, with a strategic role on the field,
as vectors of good governance.
This article adds that, in developing countries, the state is also
overtaken from the top by international stakeholders, as well as by
international, regional, and global actors, through logics of development
and structural transformation. Thus, local development, even if
eventually targeting a local space which does not necessarily mean
reduced size, is certainly a multiscalar dynamic, encompassing the local
level. Transformations at the local level also impact other levels: these
changes induce reshuffling, rehierarchization, restructuring, and
multiple other possible effects, including actors’ changing level of action.
Notwithstanding, spatial logics of overrunning of the state (modes
and forces transforming spaces that encompass state power), which
31 Nathalie Dubus, Cécile Helle and Michelle Masson-Vincent, “De la gouvernance
à la géogouvernance: de nouveaux outils pour la démocratie LOCALE
renouvelée” (2010) L’Espace politique 10:1 <https://espacepolitique.revues.
org/1574> accessed 5 August 2015.
32 Patrick Le Galès, “Du gouvernement des villes à la gouvernance urbaine” (1995)
Revue française de sciences politiques 45(1), 57-95.
33 Fabienne Leloup, Laurence Moyart et Bernard Pecqueur, “La gouvernance
territoriale comme nouveau mode de coordination territoriale ?”(2005)
Géographie, économie et société 7(4), 321-332.
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may be easily identified in developing countries, are constant
characteristics of globalization and its plural, complex and intrinsically
multiscalar dynamics. As Fabienne Leloup, Laurence Moyart, and
Bernard Pecqueur indicated using examples of industrial and commercial
clusters in West Africa, in Africa as elsewhere nowadays the state is in
charge of ensuring the redistribution of revenues at various levels
(through effective decentralization and an efficient management of its
various territories) and a coordination of development actors from the
international to the local level.34
The fundamental role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
African economies, related to industrialization (including oil refining
industries), to which the three authors refer, is to produce economic,
commercial, and spatial dynamics overrunning the state. In a global
world, industrialization of African countries and markets bypass state
capacities and control. SMEs also have an important role in line with
the contemporary investigations on financing for development for the
post-2015 agenda. A study made by the United Nations Sustainable
Development Solution Network (UNSDSN) shows that official
development assistance will continue to have a prominent role in the
post-2015 development agenda, but that innovation will be key.35
Important contributions will come from sovereign wealth funds and
other new financial tools to finance SMEs, especially those with sizeable
impacts at various levels of development, among which certainly are
SMEs working in the extractive sector.
4.  TOWARDS A FLUID, MULTISCALAR,
AND NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF
OIL AND EXTRACTIVES IN AFRICA
The multiscalar geography of oil presented above demonstrates that
its governance may not be reduced to a classic territorial governance
and to the play of forces between different stakeholders on a given
territory, because a continuous and coherent territory of extraction
and transformation does not exist, even if mechanisms of ownership
are created by the socio-economic issues that the resource engenders.
34 Ibid.
35 Guido Schmidt-Traub and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Roles of Public and Private
Development Finance” (2015), UNSDSN Issue Brief UNSDSN.
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Oil is, in fact, a fugitive and migrating underground resource,
therefore difficult to capture. This explains the need for setting up in
some contexts models of governance as property among oil-exploiting
neighbours whose contiguity makes their respective activities
dependent on one another. It is what happens nowadays in the Gulf of
Guinea for the marine exploitation, knowing that some oil companies
are operating across territorial borders (e.g. Noble Energy has core
operations in Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, but is exploring new
ventures in Sierra Leone and Gabon).
This model of governance as property, dangerous because of its
conflictual position, may be pushed to the extreme where states adopt
nationalistic approaches, such as happened in some cases in Africa,
through the fear of losing control and precedence on the exploitation
of the resource. Resource nationalisms, therefore, can have various
forms, even on the African continent:36  ready examples being Nigerian
nationalism in the 1980s and the more recent one in Mozambique.
Beyond the differences in the mechanisms of nationalisms, national
companies (e.g. Ghana National Petroleum Corporation) make the
landscape of stakeholders involved in oil extraction even more
complex, even though they open new paths of governance for the future.
Oil companies from the West or from emerging countries (like China)
cannot ignore their presence and action, forcing them to set up a dialogue
with local multinationals.
In that sense, oil is not a cooperative resource:37 it is elusive and
requires advanced scientific and technical knowledge, important
investments, and adequate legal systems. These numerous prerequisites
make the oil extraction business an elitist venture, because the number
of competitive firms in this domain is relatively reduced. To maintain a
high operational level a firm needs to secure constant and long-term
access to large exploitations, which explains the aggressive and
36 Stefan Andreasson, “Varieties of Resource Nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa’s
Energy and Minerals Markets” (2015) <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=stefan_andreasson> accessed 19
August 2015.
37 Karen Bakker, An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and
Wales (Oxford University Press 2004); Karen Bakker and Gavin Bridge, “Material
Worlds? Resource Geographies and the ‘Matter of Nature’” (2006) Progress in
Human Geography 30(1), 1-23.
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38 Richard Peet, Paul Robbins and Michael Watts (eds.), Global political ecology
(Routledge, 2010).
39 Michael Watts, “Petro-violence: Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology of
a Mythic Commodity” in Nancy L. Peluso and Michael Watts (eds), Violent
environments (Cornell University Press 2001), 189-212.
40 Kobena T. Hanson, Cristina D’Alessandro and Francis Owusu (eds), Managing
Africa’s Natural Resources. Capacities for Development (Palgrave 2014).
41 Benjamin D. Duval, “Deepwater Horizon spill made a city’s worth of air pollution”
(2012) EarthSky <http://earthsky.org/earth/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-
made-a-citys-worth-of-air-pollution> accessed 19 August 2015.
conflictual governance to conquer new unexploited areas.38 Oil
companies fight against one another to discover and control oil
exploitations or pipelines. They also aggressively defend their interests
against local communities, civil society, and African states. Shell has
had decades of fight in Nigeria against environmental and social
accusations. Soco International similarly had a short but intense conflict
for exploration rights in the Virunga National Park in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The governance adopted by states and the different
types that oil companies set in place are difficult to conciliate: the
heterogeneity and incompatibility between these two regimes of
governance clarify the apparent myopia of international oil companies,
seeming to ignore that the interests of producing countries increasingly
condition decisions on production rates.39
Furthermore, the complex landscape of multiscalar oil governance
cannot be reduced to agreements between states and to the role of oil
companies: other stakeholders make this governance more multifaceted
and complex. Additionally, extractive dynamics require taking into
account the equally complex and multiscalar environmental governance
of oil,40 encompassing local issues of pollution or occasional ecological
catastrophes, produced by a specific incident. The macro-regions in
which atmosphere pollution related to oil may be traced define the
geography of environmental damages of oil.41 There is then not only an
environmental and social cost of oil production and refining, but also
a specific governance related to the interaction of various stakeholders
(citizens, NGOs, associations, etc.), involved in the environmental
protection of areas damaged by extraction.
For these reasons, oil governance must be fluid, adapting to oil
some forms of governance used by scientists and practitioners to analyse
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42 Daniel Kübler. La métropole et le citoyen. Les agglomérations urbaines en Suisse
vues par leurs habitants (EPFL Press, 2005).
43 Vasna Ramasar, Fluid Governance. Scalar Politics in the South African Waterscape
(Lund University Publications, 2014).
44 Katsushiro Sasuga. Microregionalism and Governance in East Asia (Routledge,
2004).
45 Daniel Kübler. La métropole et le citoyen. Les agglomérations urbaines en Suisse
vues par leurs habitants (EPFL Press 2005), 117; Timothy Shaw, John A. Grant
and Scarlett Cornelissen (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms
(Ashgate, 2012).
46 Katsushiro Sasuga. Microregionalism and Governance in East Asia (Routledge,
2004), 11.
planning of metropolises42 or water management43 or some forms of
micro-regionalisms in emerging regions.44 These recent and
heterogeneous approaches fit well with the specific characteristics of
oil governance. Daniel Kübler’s analysis of Swiss cities emphasizes the
opposition between bureaucratic governance (that could be defined
as territorial, because the jurisdiction of an administration is related
to a given territory) and a fluid governance “based on conglomerates
of heterogeneous stakeholders”, in accordance with new regionalisms.45
According to Katsushiro Sasuga, fluid governance is networked, as
it links the concepts of “governance” and “network” and is specifically
used to analyse the interactions between public administrations and
private sector actors, as well as relations inside a multinational or
between multinationals.46 The micro-regions to which Sasuga refers are
explicitly intra-state spaces or trans-boundary areas; the specific
governance required in these settings is associated to economic
dynamics: multinationals, local administrations, and the state are part
of it.
The southern Chinese region is the example Sasuga used to
illustrate its definition of networked governance. This micro-regionalism
focuses on what could be called accidents of location, meaning the
consequences of location, as the author says, as well as the consequences
of state choices and decisions. The region is then in the reality a space
of networked relations, as it is the case among multinationals in Hong
Kong, where three levels may be identified: intra-multinational, inter-
multinational, and extra-multinational in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. Sasuga adds “these production networks
are increasingly linked to local governments and policy networks of all
kinds in the remarkably fluid multilevel governance arrangements that
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are emerging. Intermediate associations, such as local business
associations, also play a vitally important networking role in linking
state actors and firms”.47  The regime of multiscalar, fluid, and networked
governance encompasses the government of the nation-state, because
decision-making networks on which it relies bypass national borders
and the administrative jurisdictions of these territories, including
informal, non-governmental, and transnational mechanisms. This
governance approach attracts the attention on efficient mechanisms of
coordination of rules and actions of various stakeholders.
This governance approach is eminently political (as based on power
interactions and leadership), even if it is not limited to state functioning.
It confirms that the separation between the national and international
levels loses the effectiveness that it had in the past, because stakeholders
interact formally and/or informally at various levels, using multiscalar
decision-making networks and policies.48 Given the traditionally
centralized Chinese political system countering this transformation,
Sasuga’s case study explores the challenges of implementation of such
pluralistic and multiscalar system in southern China. This example
also facilitates a comparison with developing countries, in which
institutional capacity gaps make the creation of flexible governance
mechanisms more difficult, while fostering informal and parallel
dynamics of counter-governance (such as corruption).
The study on water governance in South Africa by Vasna Ramasar49
underlines not only the political and economic aspects and conflictual
issues related to multiscalar water management, but also that this
governance is intrinsically environmental, because ecological,
economic, and political factors shape the hydrosocial landscape of water
access and use, through justice and equity.
The governance of oil and extractive resources in general is
multiscalar, networked, and fluid, but also environmental. It aims at a
less conflictual and more effective coordination of stakeholders in formal
and informal contexts of oil extraction and processing. In Africa, these
dynamics take place in challenging contexts, although situations greatly
vary from one country to another, with specific gaps and deficits at
47 Katsushiro Sasuga. Microregionalism and Governance in East Asia (Routledge,
2004), 30.
48 Ibid: 32-33.
49 Vasna Ramasar. Fluid Governance. Scalar Politics in the South African Waterscape
(Lund University Publications, 2014).
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various levels. To improve interactions through this type of governance,
a form of geographical justice is key.
5.  FROM SPATIAL JUSTICE TO
NETWORKED JUSTICE
This dimension of governance aims to promote a flexible management
of resources, paying more attention to the various stakeholders, their
goals, and to the damages that oil exploitation may do to different
social groups and at various levels, conceptualized as spatial justice,
used for instance for territorial (and more specifically urban) policies.
Spatial justice comes from the attempt to find the fairest scale on the
part of the government for social phenomena, if any.50 Spatial justice
offers then a framework to deal with injustices and inequalities related
to oil extraction, to advocate for a better redistribution of powers and
enhance public participation, even if participatory democracy is often
only a rhetoric used in discourses justifying territorial transformations
made by public policies.
Spatial justice also reminds one of the existence of authoritarian
spaces, characterized by a peculiar practice of power.51 If in many
situations (including a number of contexts of exploitation of extractives)
good governance and democratic, participatory, and procedural justice
are not in place, in these contexts and in relation to these dynamics
one may notice peculiar forms of authority and of transmission of
authority (through financial or technological capacities, via the access
to medias and consequently by the capacity to produce widely accessible
information, etc.). In this case, authority is not related to a given
territory, but to networked dynamics, places and interactions between
stakeholders.
Following Henry Lefebvre52 and Alain Reynaud53 the spatial justice
framework has been used in a myriad of contexts to denounce spatial
inequalities (access to water, to the land, to education, to health
50 Philippe Gervais-Lambony and Frédéric Dufaux. “Justice…spatiale !” (2009)
Annales de Géographie, 665-666, 3-15.
51 Sabine Planel, “Espaces autoritaires, espaces (in)justes ?”(2015) Spatial Justice
8 July <http://www.jssj.org/article/espaces-autoritaires-espaces-injustes/>
accessed 21 August 2015.
52 Henry Levebvre, Le droit à la ville (Anthropos, 1968).
53 Alain Raynaud, Société, espace et justice (Presses Universitaires de France, 1981).
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services, etc.) and spatial segregation (in urban contexts for instance).
Spatial inequalities may be considered as spatial injustices; analyses
may consequently suggest an alternative organization of the space with
fair access to resources and to the benefits that they engender. This
also applies to the geographies of extractives and to the multiscalar
geographies of inequalities and the injustices that they cause. The
governance model presented above may specifically be a strategy to
detect and reduce these injustices in a multiscalar and coordinated
way, and on a longer term.
Applying the spatial justice framework to the governance of oil
and extractive resources, the geographical justice in these instances is
more a multiscalar, fluid, and networked justice, with discontinuous
features. Governance of extractive resources thus produces offshore
network places, to echo Sidaway on offshore spaces.54 James Sidaway
demonstrates the existence of offshore spaces with graduated
sovereignty, described as a multitude of different modes of government
for various social groups, depending on their relationship with global
markets, because each group has specific regulatory compromises and
modalities of control, in relation to a peculiar space of production.
This is exactly what happens with extractive resources, because oil
and gas create peculiar social and spatial networks, with specific rules
and modalities of interaction with global markets, not applying to the
population directly or indirectly (through pollution for example)
concerned by its extraction.
Sidaway’s paper refers to post-development, in line with
postcolonial studies and investigations on imperialism, to criticize and
contrast epistemologies of development, their categories, discourses,
assumptions, and methods;55 the negative effects of which have been
proved in Africa.56 A call for fluid and multiscalar governance framework
for extractive resources in Africa, even if differently, goes in the same
54 James D. Sidaway, “Spaces of postdevelopment” (2007) Progress in Human
Geography 31(3), 345-361.
55 Claire Mercer, Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, “Towards a critical political
geography of African development” (2003), Geoforum 34, 419-436.
56 Cristina D’Alessandro-Scarpari, Géographes en brousse. Un métissage spatial entre
discours et pratiques (L’Harmattan, 2005); Estienne Rodary, “Développer la
conservation ou conserver le développement? Quelques considérations
historiques sur les deux termes et les moyens d’en sortir” (2008) Mondes en
Développement 36(141), 81-92.
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direction, as it calls for greater ownership of resources by African
stakeholders and better mechanisms to enforce justice based spaces
and the exploitation of resources.
6.  TOWARDS A BETTER GOVERNANCE OF
EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES IN AFRICA
The argument presented in this article is that natural resource
governance, specifically for oil and gas, needs to be fluid, networked,
and multisclar. This indicates that governance is a set of coordinated
actions among stakeholders and harmonized policies at the various
levels (local, micro-regional, national, macro-regional, continental, and
global). This requires flexibility to adapt and fluidity to avoid
considering the spaces and networks involved as fixed and limited
territories. If the relationships between the government and
multinational corporations are important for the extractive sector and
its entire value chain, multiscalar considerations bring in local
governments, local associations, and international civil society
platforms among others.
The governance of extractive resources has to take into account
the entire value chain of these raw materials, giving the right place to
the extraction process without being limited to it. Concepts like (fluid
and multiscalar) governance and (networked) justice may help to
consider these issues not only from a scientific point of view, but also
with a practical goal. A better understanding through analysis helps to
set in place less conflictual governance mechanisms, paying more
attention to the needs and perspectives of the various stakeholders
involved, to prevent conflicts, injustices, and inequalities, supporting
economic transformation and development of African countries.
Development being understood as enhanced conditions of life for African
populations, reduced poverty levels, while ensuring that local
communities benefit in some way from oil revenues, not only suffering
for environmental degradation.
In developing countries, multiscalar, networked, and fluid
governance of extractive resources requires building the necessary
capacities: mainly but not only institutional, but also technical, financial,
scientific, policy, and implementation capacities. This applies equally
to African contexts, where the multiscalar approach is specifically
crucial: regional governance mechanisms for extractive resources are
still deficient and difficult to implement, although tremendous progress
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has been made through the Africa Mining Vision (AMV), the roadmap
for implementing a multiscalar mining policy (including fossil fuels
like oil and gas)s pecifically adapted to African contexts and needs.
The regional and continental scales are of particular importance in
Africa, but the national level, with specific policies and contexts is also
a crucial starting point, to which the AMV is devoting a particular
attention for its progressive implementation.
Similar to what has been said for oil and gas, an analogous approach
could be used for other natural resources. Possibly intersecting various
value chains of different resources, interfering with the same spaces at
different levels (of which the national level seems to remain preeminent
at least on the short term, given the consequences of national policies
on their exploitation), in different places or in certain situations (notably
the implementation of coordinated policies).
Governance of natural resources emphasizes the importance and
complexity of the geographical dimension of these dynamics, but it
also underlines the commitment to some kind of geographical justice
(spatial or reticular), arising from these situations. Geographers,
together with other scientists, with their expertise can help solve or
avoid conflicts related to natural resources: the gap between academic
and policy research is being reduced, but remains, especially in Africa.
